Research
My research spans the fields of political science, communication and social psychology, with an emphasis on ideology, beliefs, and affective attachments to parties and individuals. I employ various methods; however, most of my research is quantitatively oriented. I particularly enjoy using computational and experimental approaches.
Dissertation Papers
New Threat of Culture Wars? The Religious Roots of Public Opinion Polarization on Morality Issues in Europe | Preprint | Supplement | Replication files, Forthcoming in European Union Politics
Cultural polarization divides European public opinion on moral issues, from Italy’s refusal to register children of same-sex couples to abortion protests in Poland. These divisions stem from historical church-state conflicts in various religious cultures. This polarization is particularly strong in Catholic countries but less so in Protestant ones. Using data from 19 European democracies, I show a persistent gap between Catholic and Protestant countries. Developed countries no longer lead in moral issue divisions, with recent surveys showing no or reversed differences. Younger generations are more principled on moral issues except in Protestant contexts, with cohort differences in polarization growing significantly between 2008 and 2017, highlighting the enduring impact of religious traditions.
No Conservative View Left: Ideological Alignment Among European Partisans | Preprint (supplement included) | R&R in European Journal of Political Research
This study delves into the ideological alignment of partisans, a phenomenon of some beneficial and multiple troubling consequences within European political landscapes. I hypothesize a substantial asymmetry in ideological alignment between partisans on the left and right ends of the political spectrum, with profound implications for our understanding of political polarization and party strategies across Europe. Utilizing conventional methods and innovative belief network modeling, I analyze data from the fourth and eighth waves of the European Social Survey (2008, 2016), supplemented by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Manifesto Project, covering 15 European countries, 131 political parties, and 23,586 partisans, to test this hypothesis. My findings reveal that supporters of new left parties exhibit a more consistent and coherent set of beliefs compared to their right-wing counterparts. However, the study also uncovers the limits of this asymmetry in a significant shift in ideological alignment on sociocultural issues on the right, indicating the emergence of a deeper, broader ideological conflict. Furthermore, my analysis demonstrates the limited impact of strategies like position blurring and programmatic nicheness, showing only a small effect on ideological alignment in economic matters. These insights highlight the propensity of new left supporters for some worrisome consequences of high belief homogeneity, such as echo chambers and lack of cross-cutting ties, and stress the pivotal role of both the new left and the radical right in the ideological conflict across Europe.
I Don’t Need Your Attitude: Recognizable Belief Patterns Lead to More Animosity and Disagreement | Preprint soon available | Under Review
An expanding body of evidence indicates that substantive disagreement fuels partisan animosity. Pundits often use terms like “ideological disagreement” to denote a range of things, often distant from how the concept is used in belief constraint studies. These studies argue that individuals do not uniformly hold or organize their opinions. Building on this literature, I argue that we should distinguish between disagreement with centrists and different-minded people, and between those with recognizable belief structures (ideologues) and those whose beliefs are not ideologically aligned. I hypothesize that these types of low-constraint opinion mismatches result in different levels of expected disagreement and mutual animosity. This is because ideologues can predict disagreement on unobserved issues. I distinguish between ideological and non-ideological disagreements through two survey experiments with representative US samples (N = 2,000 each, conducted in January 2024 and May 2024). Using evaluations of hypothetical profiles of fellow citizens, I demonstrate that centrism and belief structures significantly influence personal affinity. In the first study, disagreement with centrists results in almost four times lower animosity than with different-minded people. Moreover, ideological alignment results in almost three times hotter feelings, even with the same levels of substantive disagreement. In the second study, I test the proposed mechanism, finding that ideologically aligned individuals expect higher agreement and disagreement in instances of the same substantive disagreement. This is particularly true for those who know “what goes with what.” These findings highlight the role of ideology in policy disagreement and political animosity.
Other Manuscripts
Democracy Erodes from the Bottom: Levels of Office, Norm Violations, and Party Defections | Tadeas Cely, Marc Jacob, Sean Westwood | Under Review
Insignificant Others Policy Abstractness and Attitude Formation among (Non-)Populists | Tadeas Cely, Roman Chytilek, Michal Toth | Under Review
Does Moral Reframing Decrease Political News Avoidance? Facts, Values and News Avoidance in an Eye-tracking Study | Michal Toth, Tadeas Cely, Roman Chytilek | Data Collection
The End of Eastern Exceptionalism? Othering And Polarization in Eastern Europe| Lenka Hrbkova, Matej Jungwirth, Tadeas Cely (equal contribution) | Data Collection
Not So Partisan? How Social Group Membership Shapes Out-Party Disdain | Tadeas Cely, Lenka Hrbkova, Matej Jungwirth | Data Collection
Messenger of Evil, Hatred, and Political Opposition: Support for Political Violence After Violent Events- Evidence from Slovakia| Tadeas Cely, Michal Tóth, Peter Spac, and Miroslav Nemcok | Design