Democratic Costs of Politicizing Violent Events

Tadeas Cely

Aarhus University

Miroslav Nemčok

University of Oslo

Michal Tóth

Masaryk University

Peter Spáč

Masaryk University

Partisan Violence

Polarization Research Lab: Political Violence Dashboard

The downstream effects of violent events have been studied before, Holliday, Lelkes, and Westwood (2024), Nai, Erkel, and Bos (2025), but the effects of elite reactions have received much less attention.

RQ: How do politicians’ reactions to partisan violence shape partisan conflict? What are the costs of politicization compared to a willingness to moderate and unite?

Partisan Violence: Illustrative Cases

Partisan Violence: Illustrative Cases

May 15, 2024

Juraj Cintula, poet, radical with no consistent ideology and many conspiratory beliefs, attempted to assassinate Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Fico survived, being treated in the hospital with multiple gunshot wounds

Seized the moment to blame the liberal opposition, which had campaigned against the government by protesting its illiberal policies, corruption, and insufficient support for Ukraine

Politicized Narratives

  • Politicians often lead public opinion, Slothuus and Bisgaard (2021), Lenz (2012)…

  • People pursue directional goals and not always accuracy, Lodge and Taber (2013), Leeper (2014)…

  • Elite narrative may lead many adopt politicized narratives contrary to evidence

  • Somewhat less strongly cueing gives also signals to people on the other side of the divide, Nicholson (2012)

Slovakia: An ideal case for studying elite influence. The opposition is persistent in its calls for unity, while the government is equally persistent in assigning blame. A clear asymmetry.

Normalization of Violence

  • Overwhelming majority rejects political violence, Kalmoe and Mason (2022a), Westwood et al. (2022), but elite narratives that justify and legitimizes violent behavior could normalize it, Kim (2025), Zyla (2024)

  • Perceiving the out-party as violent could legitimize violence against it, Landry, Druckman, and Willer (2024), Fischer and O’Mara (2023)

  • Those blamed for violence may respond with co-radicalization backlash, Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter (2006), Nai, Erkel, and Bos (2025)

Other Democratic Costs

  • Adopting a politicized narrative could not only change your own attitudes, but also how others interact with you

  • Accusatory narrative may deepen the disdain for a member of an out-party, Pedersen, Christensen, and Petersen (2025), Kim (2025)

  • Partisan rifts could, however, be somewhat mitigated if supporters of the same party disagree on the narrative, which may reduce some of the in-party affinity, Holliday, Lelkes, and Westwood (2024)

  • As you are blaming their own side, out-partisans may tolerate you less and be less committed to upholding democratic principles when dealing with you, Keane (2004), Hoffman (2020), Kingzette et al. (2021)

Hypotheses

Elite Influence

H1: Individuals supporting government parties are more likely than opposition supporters to adopt government-elite-provided, politicized narratives of political violence.

Normalization of Violence

H2: Adoption of politicized narratives is associated with increased support for political violence against the out-party.

Other Costs

H3: Out-partisans who adopt politicized narratives are evaluated more negatively than out-partisans who called for unity.

H4: Rejection of politicized narratives diminishes sympathy toward co-partisans who adopt them, but to a lesser degree than it increases antipathy toward out-partisans.

Methods

Survey

N = 1,358, March 5 to March 10, 2025

Supporters of governing parties and liberal opposition

Political Violence

  • Debates about measurement: Kalmoe and Mason (2022a), Westwood et al. (2022), Kalmoe and Mason (2022b)…
  • Six vignettes
  • Instances of mild (illegal protest, vandalism, assault) and severe violence (arson, attacks, murder)

Example

Assault: [name] was convicted of assault. He was arrested by police for throwing rocks at peaceful protesters from the other party. Although no one was seriously injured, paramedics bandaged a man with a head wound. Do you support or oppose [name]’s actions?

Experiment

Vignette

This person is [gender], [age] years old. They support one of the governing parties. [Hobby]. They firmly reject support for Ukraine, believing that it provoked the war with its neighbor. They think that [opposition politicians and their sympathetic media are responsible for all political violence / it is necessary to unite and reject any political aggression in Slovakia]

Results

Politicized Narratives

Narratives and Violence

Narratives and Violence

Affective Polarization

How sympathetic is this person to you? Very unsympathetic (0) to Very sympathetic (10)

Democratic Norms

If you had the opportunity, would you prevent this person from publicly expressing their political views? Yes/No

Conclusions

Conclusions

  • Elite narratives around violent events matter, not only violent events themselves

  • When they depart from longstanding norms and adopt politicized narratives, they hurt democracy

  • While it does not result in a spiral of violence, it does diminish relationships across party lines and diminishes support for democratic norms

References

Fischer, Vanesa, and Shane M O’Mara. 2023. “‘They Deserve It for What They’re Doing’: Dehumanising Rhetoric as a Facilitator of the Recourse to Violence Against the Defenceless.” Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 51: 101280. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2023.101280.
Hoffman, August John. 2020. “The Evolution of Conflict, Compassion and the Social Contract: A Philosophical Approach to Human Engagement.” Aggression and Violent Behavior 55: 101504. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2020.101504.
Holliday, Derek, Yphtach Lelkes, and Sean Westwood. 2024. “The July 2024 Trump Assassination Attempt Was Followed by Lower in-Group Support for Partisan Violence and Increased Group Unity.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121 (49): e2414689121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2414689121.
Kalmoe, Nathan, and Lilliana Mason. 2022a. Radical American Partisanship: Mapping Violent Hostility, Its Causes, and the Consequences for Democracy. University of Chicago Press.
———. 2022b. “A Holistic View of Conditional American Support for Political Violence.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119 (32). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2207237119.
Keane, John. 2004. Violence and Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
Kim, Taegyoon. 2025. “The Effects of Partisan Elites’ Violent Rhetoric on Support for Political Violence.” Political Behavior n/a (n/a): n/a. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-025-10025-7.
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